> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://douglas-maritime-research.gitbook.io/douglas-maritime-research-docs/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://douglas-maritime-research.gitbook.io/douglas-maritime-research-docs/readme.md). # Home ## Mark Douglas **Lieutenant Commander RNZNVR, MSc, BE(Hons), CEng, CMarEng, FIMarEST** Mark Douglas is a Maritime Domain Analyst and Naval Reserve Officer who bridges the gap between commercial intelligence and national security. Drawing on a career as a Naval Officer in the Royal New Zealand Navy, with roles at sea and ashore in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Singapore, Mark applies military-grade rigour to the open-source world. He specialises in the operational and strategic implications of the "Shadow Fleet," providing high-level counsel on sanctions evasion, maritime security, and risk mitigation. His analysis is a primary resource for investigations by *Bloomberg* and *The Insider*, and informs the policy debate on maritime enforcement. #### Global Exclusives & Major Investigations
Cover image
Pacific Flags being falsely used by the shadow fleet/files/wEIRFtQM7v3GTjzAvoeB#exclusive-pacific-flags-being-falsely-used-by-the-shadow-fleet
PLA(N) Flotilla in the Philippine Sea/files/G1bWyoLx04IXNZgfGn6J#exclusive-pla-n-flotilla-in-the-philippine-sea
Russian Naval escorts shadow fleet/files/qoLrQVHGwHRcSrpk1Xv3#exclusive-russian-naval-escorts-shadow-fleet-through-the-english-channel
#### Social Media Accounts {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} *** ## Publications & Technical Papers ### December 2025 {% embed url="" %} {% hint style="info" %} Published in *Opinio Juris*, this analysis explores the legal and operational friction caused by Russia’s "shadow fleet" in the Baltic Sea. It uses the May 2025 interception of the tanker *Jaguar* to illustrate how coastal states can navigate the constraints of UNCLOS to counter illicit maritime activity. By distinguishing between legitimate freedom of navigation and the legal vulnerabilities of "stateless" vessels using spoofed AIS, the article provides a critical framework for enforcement. It establishes a precedential argument for interdicting high-risk tankers, offering a replicable model for maritime security agencies facing similar hybrid threats globally. {% endhint %} ### October 2023 {% embed url="" %} {% hint style="info" %} Published in *Marine Professional* following a series of cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea, this article addresses the critical vulnerability of global undersea infrastructure. It critiques the current reliance on episodic naval patrols (such as NATO's *Baltic Sentry*) as expensive and operationally limited. The piece proposes a new "layered defence" model that bridges the gap between private sector ownership and public sector authority. By creating a shared maritime intelligence picture—fusing commercial data, satellite monitoring, and acoustic sensors—cable operators can provide persistent early warning while governments retain the capacity for escalation. {% endhint %} ### July 2025 {% embed url="" %} {% hint style="info" %} Published in *Marine Professional,* this analysis connects the operational precedent set by Estonia’s interception of the *Kiwala* to the complex maritime environment of Southeast Asia, arguing that Baltic enforcement tactics offer a viable model for nations like Malaysia. By contrasting the strictures of transit passage in the Singapore Strait with the broader rights to interdict stateless vessels in territorial waters, the article challenges regional actors to shift from passive observation to active policing. It concludes that while confronting the "dark fleet" carries diplomatic friction, the physical risks of inaction—demonstrated by recent collisions and explosions—now necessitate a policy shift where coastal states use existing UNCLOS provisions to set the terms of engagement in their own waters. {% endhint %} ### June 2024 {% embed url="" %} {% hint style="info" %} Published in *Marine Professional,* this article highlights a critical operational vulnerability in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), shifting the security focus from the bridge to the engine room. Analyzing ReCAAP data, the piece identifies a specific trend where perpetrators target high-value engine spares, disproportionately exposing engineering personnel to violent confrontation. It argues that while regional patrols provide external deterrence, ship operators must address the "internal" threat landscape by hardening access to machinery spaces, effectively protecting the technical crew who—unlike bridge staff—often find themselves on the unprotected front line of sea robberies. {% endhint %} *** ## Media & Investigative Commentary ### Undated {% embed url="" %} > What if Russia attacked NATO? How would Germany respond? And where are our weaknesses? We wanted answers. In a wargame, we simulate an attack on NATO’s eastern flank. Politicians, former military officials, and experts take on the roles of the German government for a day. A second team plays the Kremlin. The wargame triggered an international debate. It’s the reason we decided to publish our results in English as well. In this five-part podcast, you’ll hear a simulation of a crisis that many European leaders hope will never happen. Script and Storytelling: Antonia Beckermann, Carolina Drüten Production: Marvin Schwarz If you enjoy the podcast, we’d love to see your ratings on the podcast platforms. If you have any questions, suggestions, or feedback, feel free to comment below the episode or email us at . Imprint: Privacy Policy: *** ### July 2026 #### China’s Pacific SLBM test {% hint style="info" %} Reports indicate that Chinese satellite tracking vessels have deployed to the Pacific Ocean to monitor a planned strategic missile test. The timing of the notification closely followed the signing of the Ocean of Peace Alliance between Australia and Fiji. {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %} > “These vessels carry large satellite dishes used to track missile launches and other space activity and are likely in the Pacific to collect data from the missile test China has reportedly notified regional governments to expect within 24 hours.” > > “This test has been planned well in advance. That said, the notification landing the day after Australia and Fiji signed the Ocean of Peace Alliance is interesting, to say the least.” *** {% embed url="" %} > “These vessels carry large satellite dishes used to track missile launches and other space activity and are likely in the Pacific to collect data from the missile test China has reportedly notified regional governments to expect within 24 hours.” > > “This test has been planned well in advance. That said, the notification landing the day after Australia and Fiji signed the Ocean of Peace Alliance is interesting, to say the least.” *** {% embed url="" %} > “They’ve had to get the vessels in place. The submarine, which we clearly can’t track, has been out to find its place and to launch.” > > “So while the announcement was being signed by Australia and Fiji, and while this test was being carried out, there was a Chinese satellite tracking vessel alongside the wharf there.” — which “certainly raises a few eyebrows.” *** ### June 2026 {% embed url="" %} ***Reported by BBC Verify*** > "Given that the Cameroon registry had delisted Smyrtos before she sailed through the Channel there were definitely reasonable grounds to suspect the vessel was without nationality," he said. *** #### Iran war: Eight fuel ships are on their way — how many more will follow?
{% embed url="" %} > New Zealanders have become experts at tracking fuel ships in the past couple of weeks as supply becomes more restricted and refineries look for alternative supplies outside of the war-torn Middle East. > > There were eight fuel ships heading to New Zealand from several points in Asia as of Monday night, said Mark Douglas, analyst at Starboard Maritime Intelligence which tracks shipping around the world. > > "As soon as a ship in Korea ... finishes loading and says it's going to New Zealand, everyone in New Zealand fairly well knows about it," Douglas said. *** {% embed url="" %} *** {% embed url="" %} ***Radio — Heather du Plessis-Allan Drive, Newstalk ZB*** Mark Douglas on the shaky situation in the Strait of Hormuz and what it means for New Zealand's fuel supply. *** {% embed url="" %} ***Radio — Morning Report, RNZ*** Mark Douglas on what a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz could mean for New Zealand. *** ### May 2026 {% embed url="" %} > "Shipping, and most noticeably AIS data, got caught in the crossfire," he said. *** {% embed url="" %} > "We're seeing a few coming out and heading to places where we'd like to see them to go, the likes of Singapore and up round to Korea. But compared to pre-conflict, it's a very small amount." *** ### April 2026 #### Podcast — *Saltwater Strategists* (Australian Naval Institute) {% embed url="" %} Mark Douglas features on the Australian Naval Institute's *Saltwater Strategists* podcast — "Maritime Domain Awareness: Contemporary Perspectives" — discussing how maritime domain awareness is expanding beyond naval operations, and how AI-driven platforms are transforming the way governments and industry manage threats from illegal fishing and immigration to the protection of critical energy and communications infrastructure. *** ### March 2026 #### Feature: China’s deep-sea mining fleet and the surveillance of subsea cables {% hint style="info" %} A joint **CNN–Mongabay** investigation into how China’s deep-sea mining research fleet doubles as a platform for military-relevant seabed surveillance. Starboard’s analysis placed the survey ship *Xiang Yang Hong 03* ("Facing the Red Sun 03") over a known trans-Pacific cable in November 2023 — roughly 48 hours and \~400 square nautical miles of tightly focused survey work, a smaller footprint than the vessel’s other surveys, suggesting a targeted hunt for objects of interest on the seabed. {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %} > The vessel “made a fairly direct line straight to one particular part of the ocean,” where undersea cables had been laid three years prior, said Mark Douglas, a Starboard analyst. It then continued to do what appeared to be “a very focused little bit of survey work over the course of a couple of days over (the) top of the cable," before it left the area. Douglas called the vessel’s movements “a smoking gun,” that points to likely dual-use operations. {% embed url="" %} > "These gaps are significant," Mark Douglas, an analyst for Starboard Maritime who is also in the New Zealand naval reserves, told Mongabay and CNN in an email. He said the Chinese ship "demonstrates a deliberate pattern of operating in sensitive areas, outside the view of traditional tracking systems." ***

Starboard Maritime Intelligence tracking shared with ABC News Verify: a sanctioned tanker broadcasting false AIS data holds an unnaturally fixed position while surrounding vessels swing at anchor in the Persian Gulf.

{% embed url="" %} > "All the vessels around it are swinging on their anchors. Vessels don't stay perfectly still in real life. Even when they're anchored, they move around as the tide and the wind push them around. But this vessel seems to be completely resistant to all forces of nature." > > "What you're seeing is a sanctioned vessel providing weeks of false AIS data as it moves through the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf. The vessel is almost certainly doing this to hide the loading of Iranian oil at a terminal in the Northern Persian Gulf." *** {% embed url="" %} ***Syndicated via Agence France-Presse*** > "At no time has the behavior been the same as this," Douglas said. "During other periods of adverse weather the vessels returned to port, rather than massing offshore in these kinds of formations." > > "I can't speak to the why... but the how certainly seems to be that there was direction provided to these vessels that this is what they needed to do," Douglas said. *** {% embed url="" %} > "Any vessel navigating the area clearly can't rely on GPS. That compounds the security situation in which vessels have been struck." *** {% embed url="" %} > "Traffic has dropped from a typical 50 tankers over 100 metres travelling in both directions every day, down to zero." *** ### January 2026 #### Exclusive: Pacific Flags being falsely used by the shadow fleet

Starboard Maritime Intelligence said they have tracked 10 "shadow fleet" vessels falsely flying the flag of Tonga. Graphic shows tracking over a period of time between 1 December 2025 and 13 January 2025.

{% embed url="" %} > Starboard analyst Mark Douglas told RNZ Pacific it would be highly unusual for Tonga to flag oil tankers, given their ship registry closed all the way back in 2002. > > "It's just not something that Tonga is known for doing.... if they don't have insurance and they're not well maintained, if there's an accident it would be in the hands of the flag state to fix that problem," he said. > > "Tonga is obviously not wanting to deal with this problem, but somebody's trying to pretend that they do." > > Douglas said the vessels tracked through a Malaysian port at East Johor, which according to reporting by Bloomberg last year was a notorious place for Iranian crude oil to be rebranded] as Malaysian, before being exported to China. > > At the time, there was more crude oil being exported from Malaysia to China than what Malaysia was actually producing, Bloomberg reported. > > Another, Douglas said, had made it to the Norwegian Sea headed for Russia. {% embed url="" %} > The majority of the vessels are crude oil carriers that appear to be operating between Iran and China, with the vessels loading Iranian crude in the Persian Gulf before conducting ship-to-ship transfers and other movements designed to hide the true origin of the oil before unloading it in China, said Mark Douglas, maritime domain analyst with Starboard Maritime Intelligence in New Zealand. > > "These tankers normally take on false flags in order to continue trading after being removed from other flags, normally due to sanctions violations," Douglas told DW. > > **Crews interfering with Automatic Identification System** > > Under modern maritime law, ships are assigned numbers used by the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which allows authorities to trace them and reduces the possibility of collision. > > "Of the 29 tankers identified as falsely using the Tongan or Cook Island flag, 21 are sanctioned and another two are transmitting invalid AIS numbers, which makes checking their sanction status more difficult," according to the analyst. *** {% embed url="" %} > “The sight of that many vessels operating in concert is staggering,” said Mark Douglas, an analyst at Starboard, a company with offices in New Zealand and the United States. Mr. Douglas said that he and his colleagues had “never seen a formation of this size and discipline before.” {% embed url="" %} ***Syndicated via Agence France-Presse*** > Former Royal New Zealand Navy officer Mark Douglas said some 150 foreign tankers were registered in the Cook Islands at its busiest point in 2024. > > "It certainly seemed at its peak that it was 'pay to play'," said Douglas, now an analyst for Starboard Maritime Intelligence. > > "If you turned up with some good paperwork and the cheque cleared, you were able to get the Cook Islands' flag." > > Cook Islands had since de-registered many of the most dubious vessels, Douglas said, but there were "some left that have question marks over them". {% embed url="" %} > “The story is really a persistent, global reflagging of dark-fleet tankers,” said Mark Douglas, a maritime domain analyst at Starboard Maritime Intelligence. “It’s unlikely to stop at this number.” {% embed url="" %} ***Syndicated via iPaper UK*** > Mark Douglas, of Starboard Maritime Intelligence, told *The i Paper* that an increase in sea ice has closed the northern passage along Russia’s Arctic coast, meaning many more vessels are expected to take the route around UK waters. > > He added: “The fact that 50 such vessels continue to operate is a concern, not just for the continued flow of oil and other goods to feed Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, but also the risk that these vessels travelling – which are often old and lack proper management and oversight – pose to critical maritime and underwater infrastructure and the environment.”
{% embed url="" %} > “Reflagging to Russia is increasingly being used by these tankers to allow them to continue operating and gain some sort of legitimacy and protection,” said Mark Douglas, a maritime analyst with Starboard Maritime Intelligence.
*** ### December 2025 #### Exclusive: PLA(N) Flotilla in the Philippine Sea

Starboard Maritime Intelligence interface showing the detected PLA(N) formation (red squares) vs. cloud cover and AIS tracks of other vessels in the area.

{% hint style="success" %} Using a combination of AIS data, 10-metre resolution Sentinel-2 Optical Imagery, and LLM-enhanced imagery analysis, I was able to locate and identify a PLA(N) amphibious ready group (ARG) operating in the Philippine Sea. While the existence and approximate location of the group had been made public by Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles, **Starboard Maritime Intelligence was the first to provide unclassified, open-source details of the group.** {% endhint %} > The maritime intelligence firm's analyst, Mark Douglas, said the PLA-N destroyer and the frigate would provide protection for the flotilla, and that the frigate would be "looking for submarines that might be monitoring the task group." > > The company also said the replenishment vessel would be acting as a "mobile logistics hub, carrying over 11,000 tons of fuel and dry stores." > > "This support effectively untethers the flotilla from shore-based ports, extending its cruising range to over 10,000 nautical miles —sufficient to transit around major landmasses like Australia without entering port," it said. > > Still, Mr Douglas stressed it was not yet possible to say whether or not the flotilla was heading towards Australia. > > "Intent is hard to gauge from \[the images] — we can see that they're definitely going south-east," he told the ABC. > > "It's a long way from there to Australia. We're working with our partners to get more imagery to determine in what direction it might be heading in the future." {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} *** {% embed url="" %} > In line with this reality, Mark Douglas, an analyst at the ship tracking firm Starboard Maritime Intelligence, [told](https://theins.press/en/news/285645) *The Insider* that any intensified monitoring is more likely to generate grounds for new sanctions than to stop vessels outright: > > > “From everything I've seen, Denmark is just going to be more closely monitoring these tankers…I don't think this announcement will see any tankers being stopped. > > > > What seems more likely, and what I think other oversight measures have done, is provide more information to enable sanctioning on tankers and also the insurance companies that enable them. > > > > No EU sanctioned tankers are allowed to stop at Danish ports, so the impact on those tankers is zero — they are managing to operate without Danish ports already. Maybe Denmark could ban tankers loaded in Russia from their ports, but some of those tankers (mostly Greek owned) are operating legitimately under the price cap, and I think in general it's unlikely that Denmark would ban vessels without EU sanctions to back them. > > > > So I think these new measures are not significantly different from what's in place. If they result in more tankers being sanctioned, that should help to make the oil trade harder, but it seems unlikely that they will have an immediate difference on the trade.” {% embed url="" %} ***Syndicated via Bloomberg*** > “While the US has sanctioned numerous vessels and organizations, it hasn’t stemmed the flow. Physical boarding is the next step,” said Mark Douglas, a maritime domain analyst at Starboard Maritime Intelligence. “It’s a signal that falsifying locations and documentation is no longer a shield. It’s now what makes you a target.” *** ### November 2025 {% embed url="" %} > Former Royal New Zealand Navy officer Mark Douglas’ interest in shipping subterfuge was piqued when he was working in Singapore and found a vessel pretending to be an oil tanker. The tanker in question had been scrapped years earlier. > > \ > “It turns out the vessel was a grab-dredger that was going over the hulk of World War 2 wrecks and pulling up scrap metal from war graves. It was nuts that somebody would do that and then try to hide it like that,” says Douglas. > > \ > Douglas now works as an analyst for Starboard Maritime Intelligence, a Wellington-based startup that has raised $23m to fuse information from transponders, satellite imagery and radar – along with vessel ownership and insurance data – to track in real-time the more than 100,000 vessels cruising the world’s oceans. > > By July 2024, there were nearly three times as many tankers on the Cook Islands’ books than there had been two years prior, with many new entries among the largest vessels plying the globe’s sealanes. > > \ > Douglas said 57 of the peak fleet of 150 were suspected of transporting Russian oil in breach of sanctions, 74 doing similarly for Iran. Ultimately, nearly half of the Cook Islands tanker fleet at its peak in July 2024 has ended up being formally sanctioned by the United States, the United Kingdom, or the European Union. > > \ > “To be able to get that many vessels that quickly is pretty impressive. And the fact that a large amount of this growth ended up being vessels that were subsequently sanctioned is concerning,” Douglas says of the Cook Islands’ booming tanker trade.

Cook Islands-flagged tanker traffic in August 2024 visualised by Starboard Maritime Intelligence. The registry, managed by Maritime Cook Islands, signed up many now-sanctioned vessels linked to shadow fleets that exported Russian and Iranian oil.

{% embed url="" %} > Analyst Mark Douglas of Starboard Maritime Intelligence detailed possible solutions to the problem in a comment to *The Insider*: > > > “\[For the Baltic states,] there are options to conduct port state inspections to find any issues with the vessel and the way it is operating, including holding all the correct insurance and paperwork for the fuel they’ve transferred. Or they could try and restrict the supply of fuel to the vessels, although that would be difficult. Both vessels are flagged in Cyprus, so they could raise it with that government. Or the countries that have sanctioned the ‘shadow tankers’ involved could look into sanctioning the bunker tankers. For instance, the U.S. has sanctioned tug boats that had been assisting with ship-to-ship transfers in Southeast Asia.” > > Regarding the need for “shadow fleet” vessels to refuel in Baltic waters rather than in nearby Russian ports where they are loaded, the analyst noted: > > > “Some tankers can burn cargo oil in their main engines, so they don’t need to refuel. Others do need to refuel, and if you’re in port loading, it would make sense to load bunker at the same time. But there are still tankers spoofing locations to pretend they’re not going into Russian ports, and for those vessels refueling outside Russian waters might help hide their activities.” *** {% tabs %} {% tab title="July 2025" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% endtab %} {% tab title="October 2025" %} {% embed url="" %} **France has detained a tanker from Russia's "shadow fleet" in the English Channel, which was previously spotted off the coast of Denmark amid a drone threat.** {% endembed %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% endtab %} {% endtabs %} *** ### June 2025 #### Exclusive: Russian Naval escorts shadow fleet through the English Channel {% embed url="" %} {% hint style="success" %} Following a tip-off from OSINT analysts on Bluesky, I identified that the Russian Navy corvette BOIKIY, which was broadcasting on AIS under a masked identity, was transiting through the English Channel with the false-flagged shadow fleet tankers SELVA and SIERRA. Further analysis confirmed that the three vessels appeared to have coordinated their movements in the weeks leading up to the transit. This allowed **Starboard Maritime Intelligence to provide the first unclassified, open-source evidence of direct coordination between the Russian Navy and the shadow fleet.** {% endhint %} > The escort was first reported by Mark Douglas, a maritime domain awareness analyst at New Zealand-based Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Douglas spoke with the *All Exclusive* project*,* explaining that automatic identification system (AIS) data revealed coordinated movements between three vessels starting June 16. > > The ships involved in the operation were: the Steregushchiy-class corvette *Boikiy*; the tanker *Selva* (also known under the aliases *Nostos* and *Naxos*), which is sanctioned by the UK; and the tanker *Sierra* (also known as the *Suvorovskiy Prospekt*), which is under both UK and EU sanctions. > > > “Their movements suggest deliberate timing to allow all three vessels to transit simultaneously, en route to load oil in Russia,” Douglas wrote. {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} *** {% tabs %} {% tab title="April 2025" %} {% embed url="" %} ***Syndicated via Bloomberg*** {% endtab %} {% tab title="May 2025" %} {% embed url="" %} **Another "shadow fleet" vessel entered the Baltic Sea without documentation. Under the observation of a Finnish patrol, it was able to escape to Russian waters.** {% endembed %} {% embed url="" %} **Another unregistered tanker has entered the Baltic Sea. Its behavior indicates it belongs to Russia's "shadow fleet."** {% endembed %} {% endtab %} {% tab title="June 2025" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} ***Syndicated via Bloomberg*** {% endtab %} {% endtabs %} *** ### March 2025 #### Expert reaction: North Sea tanker collision (Stena Immaculate / Solong) {% embed url="" %} > Collisions of this type are uncommon but not unheard of. In July 2024, the tanker HAFNIA NILE collided with another tanker, CERES I, in the South China Sea off Johor, Malaysia. Similar to yesterday's incident, HAFNIA NILE was navigating through an anchorage when it struck the anchored CERES I, igniting fires on both vessels and triggering a rescue operation. However, in that case, the fires were quickly brought under control, and the loss of cargo was minimal. CERES I was not loaded at the time, and HAFNIA NILE lost only a small amount of her cargo of naphtha, which, like the jet fuel aboard STENA IMMACULATE, disperses and evaporates quickly.